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Abstract
The expansion of higher education raises the risk environment for school-leavers as more 
occupations become partially graduate with the result that occupational signals are fuzzy. This 
makes the educational decision more difficult and more risky, especially with more of the cost 
of higher education being transferred to the individual. After a discussion of the nature of risk, 
derived from Beck, and of the role of government policy and of economics in obscuring this, 
the analysis uses simple quantitative techniques, based on British Labour Force Survey data, to 
demonstrate the increased fuzziness of graduate work. It is also shown that a rising proportion of 
graduates receive only average pay, thus raising the risks associated with educational investments 
even further.
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Introduction
The expansion of higher education has allowed a substantial proportion of young people – in 
some countries a majority – to obtain a university degree. Yet while young people stand 
to benefit from this they are also, in Beck’s terms (1992), exposed to greater risk. Most 
obviously, as the costs of higher education are increasingly shouldered by the student, 
especially in the UK, the danger of financial loss also increases. The calculation of risk 
itself becomes more risky; as costs rise more is at stake. However, for Beck, risk is a 
social parameter, not only an individual calculation. In the case of higher education, 
expansion has blurred the boundary between graduate and non-graduate work and thus 
altered the risk environment. Knowing what is a graduate job is surely an important fac-
tor in the decision whether to participate in higher education.
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It is unlikely that many young people calculate the economic value of education 
relative to an expected career. They are likely instead to have a notion of a ‘good’ job, 
which would partially be based on some (often vague) idea of expected pay, but also 
on the job’s prestige and the skills it requires. The latter are particularly important but 
are difficult to assess when graduate employment is rapidly increasing. While some 
occupations have become wholly graduate and others remain wholly non-graduate, 
many occupations are now partially graduate, producing unclear occupational choices. 
This is not the sole cause of a lack of defined occupational norms, as occupational 
boundaries are altered by many factors, including rapid technological change (Purcell, 
2000), but whether a job is perceived to be graduate is likely to be critical to the indi-
vidual’s decision to go to university, and this occupational norm is becoming less 
certain.
This article investigates the parameters of this growing risk through descriptive 
quantitative analysis of the proportion of employees in occupations comprising gradu-
ates and the pay they can expect to receive. It is shown that an increasing percentage 
of graduates enter jobs which are neither clearly graduate nor clearly non-graduate, so 
that many graduates compete against non-graduates economically while often they 
will be doing the same type of work. The main test is the proportion of graduates 
receiving average pay. Has this risen or fallen? Before this analysis the article argues 
that the risk environment is partly created but also masked by uncritical policy argu-
ments and apparent social-scientific evidence in favour of individual investments in 
higher education.
Education and the Risk Society
Belief in the value of education makes it difficult to recognise that education is part of the 
risk society. There has certainly been a long-term critique of education within sociology, 
and to a far lesser extent economics (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 1976), but this has been 
directed mostly at its maldistribution and its link with social inequality (e.g. Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990; Halsey et al., 1980; Jencks, 1972; Shavit and Mueller, 1998), which with 
the expansion of education and growing strain on public budgets has since then mutated 
into a firm policy concern (e.g. within Britain: DBIS, 2011a, 2011b; DES, 2003: 17). 
Rarely, though, has the value of education itself been questioned (with extreme exceptions 
such as Illich, 1970). While access to higher education is still unequal, and while unequal 
access might extend to inequality in forms of delivery (Ainley, 1994; Trowler, 1998), the 
expansion of higher education is nevertheless spreading risk to an increasingly large pro-
portion of the young population. For Beck risk is diffuse (2000a: 3).
Beck’s analysis is suggestive but not conclusive, however. Its often pessimistic lan-
guage can sometimes be easily contradicted. For instance, in arguing for an individuali-
sation of risk in employment (1992: 139–50, 2000a), Beck relies on evidence of a trend 
increase in flexible labour through part-time, temporary contracts, and reduced job ten-
ure, but this evidence is not strong enough to confirm a major shift. It is at best partially 
true, varies greatly by country, and is subject to contradictory trends (Gallie, 1996; 
Green, 2006; Muffels, 2008). Yet there is other evidence in favour of the idea of the indi-
vidualisation of risk in employment, which Beck does not cite and which has education 
286 Sociology 47(2)
rather than employment as the central problem. One indicator is the large proportion of 
employees overqualified for the work they do, which varies over time and across coun-
tries from about 20 per cent to even 50 per cent (Borghans and De Grip, 2000; Büchel 
et al., 2003; Hartog, 2000). This evidence shows that overqualification lowers returns to 
education. It is also associated with reduced job satisfaction and high occupational turno-
ver as people find themselves in the wrong job or even wrong type of job (Longhi and 
Brynin, 2009; Parrado et al., 2007).
In the case of graduates, even in the early 1990s concern was expressed at narrowing 
wage differentials between graduates and non-graduates (Murphy, 1994); overqualifi-
cation amongst graduates – that is, graduates doing non-graduate work – is common 
(Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Purcell et al., 2005). As education is not fully utilised, on 
average this gives rise to lower wages than would otherwise be the case (Brynin, 2002). 
Pearson, using data on graduate recruitment, talks about the ‘demise’ of the graduate 
labour market as a decreasing proportion of graduates have managerial or professional 
jobs. ‘For the majority [of new graduates], moving into employment is a slow transition 
with many experiencing several years of turbulence and having to compete for jobs with 
non-graduates …’ (2006: 76). Chevalier and Lindley find that overqualification 
increased during the expansion of higher education in the UK in the 1990s by around 
one-third and argue that as a result of oversupply ‘non-traditional graduate jobs have 
been upgraded to make use of the additional supply of graduates’ (2009: 333), though 
only a proportion of the overqualified are nevertheless dissatisfied with the work they 
do. Primarily but not wholly in the UK there has also been a long-term pursuit of a 
general rather than vocational education (e.g. Sanderson, 1999), which exacerbates this 
problem. Mason notes an increasing reliance on graduate employment in Britain rela-
tive to higher intermediate vocation qualifications and that this is partly driven by 
excess supply of individuals with degrees; this causes employers to substitute graduates 
for non-graduates even where employers ‘are unable to identify any improvement in 
performance …’ (2000: 18).
Overqualification, low pay and occupational turnover are all indicators of an increas-
ingly poor fit between the supply of and demand for graduates. This misfit is itself an 
indicator of the growing risk environment that school-leavers face.
The Manipulation of the Risk Environment
Beck points to the role of science in creating risk, then masking it, a possibility which 
arises from the fact that an individual cannot generally measure this. In the case of pol-
lution, for example, we rely on public, not private information. Individuals no doubt 
know that the educational strategies they adopt have uncertain outcomes, but risk is 
further built into the system precisely through the attempt to minimise it. One example is 
‘assistance’ provided by university league tables. Through operations such as aggrega-
tion of indicators or treatment of missing data, as well as the weightings given to indi-
vidual components, these are liable to produce contrived and misleading outcomes 
(Davies, 1997; Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996; Marginson, 2007; Oswald, 2007). 
There is some evidence that would-be students in fact pay little attention to such rankings 
(Eccles, 2002), and also, where they do, that the advantage is skewed by social class or 
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similar factors (Clarke, 2006), but the point here is that such information appears to 
reduce the risk environment while not reducing the actual risk.
The ‘numbers game’ helps structure the political and ideological debates around 
higher education (Davies, 1997: 50). Policy-makers, for instance, might see the expan-
sion of higher education as a solution to the UK’s long-standing skills deficit, but from 
the individual (and perhaps national) point of view support for expansion of high-quality 
vocational training might be both more useful and less risky. One possible interpretation 
is that individuals are being asked to risk financial loss over their careers in response to 
ongoing policy failures. A policy document might clearly state that ‘The benefits of 
higher education for individuals are far-reaching’ then vaguely qualify this: ‘On average, 
graduates get better jobs and earn more than those without higher education’ (DES, 2003: 
4), yet the qualifier ‘on average’ is critical. This powerful message masks the risks indi-
viduals face when they perhaps decide they have no choice but to invest; it also masks 
the role of the state in spreading the risk environment. Other policy documents are less 
inhibited than the above.
Along with what to study, one of your biggest questions about higher education will be how to 
pay for it. There’s more financial help available than you might think.
What’s more, 94% of students agree that university is a good investment. … The qualifications 
you earn can help you get a better job with much better money – in fact, over the course of your 
working life, if you’ve got an undergraduate degree, you can expect to earn, on average, 
comfortably over £100,000 more than someone similar with two or more A levels, net of taxes 
and in today’s valuation. (DBIS, 2009)
With the ‘risk regime’, ‘people are expected to make their own life-plans, to be mobile 
and to provide for themselves’ (Beck, 2000a: 70). The prediction that a graduate job 
is ‘necessary’ becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because the demand for higher edu-
cation changes the structure of occupations, making them increasingly graduate and 
therefore increasingly desirable. ‘Everyday life thus becomes an involuntary lottery 
of misfortune … It has become almost impossible not to take part in this raffle …’ 
(Beck, 2000b: 217). Are students ‘involuntary captives’ (Riesman, 1980: 90)? The 
issue here is not whether there is more risk than in the past but that risk is increasingly 
unavoidable.
Economics, in contrast to much sociology, is almost cheerfully optimistic, tending to 
see in the above problems simply ‘random noise’ rather than a central problem, as for 
instance in criticism of the idea that overqualification is an indicator of market failure 
as opposed to a temporary career adjustment (Sloane, 2003). The market is not perfect 
but is generally held to work at least approximately. This faith is perhaps most clearly 
visible in the concept of human capital. While this has its critics (e.g. Manski, 1993) it 
is a resilient idea. Graduates earn more than non-graduates and will over a lifetime more 
than recoup the costs of their investments. Prospective graduates perceive this to be the 
case and so invest in their own ‘human capital’, much as an industrialist invests in 
machinery. Most empirical studies confirm the theory’s results (e.g. Harmon et al., 
2001). This is the case even when they start out from different theoretical premises such 
as signalling theory (Spence, 1973). There are imperfections: for example high-ability 
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children of low-income parents are unable to finance their education, but then the prob-
lem is simply one of imperfect financial markets, therefore not fundamental (Checchi, 
2006: 87).
Human capital theory can, however, be taken to be an example of Beck’s ‘manufac-
tured uncertainties’ (2000b). That young people calculate costs against benefits even 
roughly has always been a figment of economists’ imaginations, acknowledged even 
within the discipline. ‘Having witnessed the struggles of econometricians to learn the 
returns to schooling, I find it difficult to accept the proposition that adolescents are 
endowed with this knowledge’ (Manski, 1993: 49). The prospective student has, 
according to economists, to estimate the ‘purchase’ cost of education itself plus main-
tenance costs, foregone earnings while out of work studying, interest costs on any 
loans, and against this the likely earnings, discounted to take inflation into account. 
From the individual’s point of view the process is often akin to fortune-telling, and yet 
the pressure to work something out increases; rising costs force the calculation of the 
incalculable.
Young people might have only vague career aspirations. One study in Britain found 
that during post-16 education only 21 per cent of students had ‘definitely decided’ on 
a future career (Dearing, 1996: 49). Even the decision whether or not to remain in 
education post 16 is often subject to change; while a large core of students maintain 
fairly stable plans this masks not insignificant year-on-year fluctuation (Brynin and 
Bynner, 2003; Croll, 2009). At a very early age career aspirations tend to be unrealis-
tic. While these become more focussed over time, even by the age of 17 a large pro-
portion of students do not view future work in terms of future earnings, ‘with few 
making rational decisions based upon their skills’ (Morris et al., 1999: 67). While 
governments assume that young people are human capitalists, using a large qualita-
tive sample Ball et al. find not only that a substantial proportion eschew planning but 
that ‘the decisions and strategies of those who plan do not appear to be solely or even 
primarily related to the calculation of economic returns’ (2000: 18). Education is 
simply one element of the process of forming, or opposing, identities. The educational 
decision is especially difficult in homes where there is no previous experience of 
higher education; it is often achieved after a process of uncertainty, shifting ideas, 
emotional stress, and inputs from a range of family viewpoints. Young people in these 
situations tend to follow step-by-step paths through education rather than jumping 
straight from school to a degree course at university (Christie, 2009; Forsyth and 
Furlong, 2003; Green and Web, 1997; Thomas and Quinn, 2007: 48–66). Payne’s 
review of post-compulsory choices in particular points to difficulties for children of 
working-class parents where the decision to go to university is seen as fraught with 
cultural, emotional and economic risk (2003). Class background no doubt plays a role 
here, dividing risk into several types. Those with a higher class background are likely 
to see risk in terms of failure to maintain class position (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), 
which is therefore additional to the risk of financial loss, though at the same time the 
latter will be limited in wealthier households; for those with a less well-off back-
ground both financial resources and expectations are likely to be lower, with the result 
that for some it might be more rational not to risk at all. In between these two extremes 
risk is considerable.
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People do not behave in the way that human capital theorists suppose. Just as criti-
cally, the empirical evidence these theorists use to justify the theory is misleading. This 
evidence consists of the stability of the ‘graduate premium’ – the pay advantage to 
having a degree. This has generally held up fairly well despite educational expansion, 
suggesting a rising demand for skills, which produces appropriate pay signals (e.g. 
Blundell et al., 2000; Harmon et al., 2001; McIntosh, 2005). There does in fact seem 
to be some decline in the value of a degree, if calculated differently (Brynin, 2002; 
Elias and Purcell, 2003), but more important is that the traditional analysis of the 
returns to education generally takes no account of distributions. What little work exists 
on this in fact suggests that returns are higher at the top end of the wage distribution 
(Harmon et al., 2001: 14). In other words, some graduates earn huge premia, but this 
means that the calculation of ‘average’ premia contains considerable redundancy. 
Many professional people, for instance in medical occupations, or those working in 
finance, earn very substantial salaries. Their pay raises the apparent average return to 
a degree very considerably, while perhaps the bulk of graduates, a proportion of whom 
will be doing work that can be undertaken by non-graduates, earn little more than non-
graduates, and some might earn less. For these people the returns to a degree, espe-
cially as the cost of education rises, is uncertain and possibly negative. It is distributions 
that we should deal with.
Methods
The analysis has three objectives. The first relates to the idea of an occupational norm. 
What is a typical graduate job and what proportion of employees can be considered to 
be clearly in neither graduate nor non-graduate work? The risk environment derives 
from the tendency of the system to produce confusing signals. Occupations are associ-
ated with a variety of signals, which surely include the skills expected for the job. These 
are defined here by the percentage of graduate employees in an occupation. This oper-
ates as a visible norm, a signal to potential entrants saying whether the type of job they 
want is graduate or not. While the percentage of graduates in occupations is rising, so 
that the norm is generally positive, this norm is also uncertain. This is demonstrated 
simply through examining what proportion of occupations can be considered to be in 
this ‘grey’ zone.
Second, when we look at the distribution of pay, for what proportion of employees is 
a degree helpful? For an economist the measure of risk is really the graduate premium 
– the gap between the wages of graduates and non-graduates; however, this ignores dis-
tributions. A proportion of graduates do well, others far less well, and it is the proportion 
placed at risk which is important. The analysis therefore compares the wage distributions 
of graduates and non-graduates.
Third, is getting into a higher class the only objective of being a graduate or does this 
still mean that a graduate can be doing a poor job? Class alone cannot tell us enough 
about risk. Does achieving a ‘good job’, that is, not only a ‘high-class’ job but within this 
one that also pays well, depend on being a graduate? This analysis introduces occupa-
tional class, using the British NS-SEC1 (Rose et al., 2005).
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The analysis is based on data from the British Labour Force Survey (LFS), covering 
1993 to 2008 (starting in 1993 as this is the earliest date for which wage information is 
available). Wage data are deflated so that a pound is worth the same whatever the year 
and is the hourly wage in all cases. The analysis covers men and women aged 16 to 60 
who work at least 10 hours a week. Those with extremely high and low wages (under £1 
or above £80 per hour) are excluded. For additional analysis of generational class effects 
the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) is used.
Results
The Risk Environment
It was argued above that a degree is increasingly necessary for those wishing to do well 
in their careers economically. Work by economists supports this belief, as do govern-
ment reports and much media coverage. The risk environment impels young people into 
higher education, and so the government’s claim becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
more people enter work as graduates, so more jobs seem to be graduate jobs. At the 
same time, however, the graduate norm is uncertain. Arbitrarily defining a range of 
graduate density (the percentage of employees in an occupation who are graduates) of 
between 10 and 40 per cent as ‘indeterminate’, that is, neither graduate nor convinc-
ingly graduate, then the proportion of all employees in this zone of uncertainty increased 
over the period from less than 22 per cent in 1993 to 38 per cent in 2008. While some 
occupations are becoming entirely or at least largely graduate, others are moving from 
non-graduate to marginally graduate or from marginally to partly graduate. However, 
few graduates work in manual occupations. If we look only at non-manual occupations, 
these last two figures rise to around 37 per cent and 60 per cent respectively. By 2008 
getting on for two-thirds of non-manual employees worked in occupations which can-
not be defined as clearly graduate or non-graduate. It is not possible to produce percent-
ages for specific occupations across the entire period as a result of the change to the 
coding system in 2000 (from SOC90 to SOC2000), but in some cases this is possible. 
For instance, ‘scientific technicians’ were 17.2 per cent graduate in 1993, 20.6 in 2000 
and 25.2 per cent in 2008; ‘health associate professionals’ such as nurses, midwives or 
dispensing opticians were 13.5 per cent graduate in 1993, 22.4 per cent in 2000 and 30.8 
per cent in 2008; and, at a lower level of graduate employment, ‘numerical clerks and 
cashiers’ (accounts clerks, counter clerks and debt collectors) were 6.8 per cent graduate 
in 1993, 9.7 per cent in 2000, and although relabelled slightly thereafter as ‘administra-
tive occupations: finance’ (credit controllers, accounts clerks and counter clerks), 13.7 
per cent in 2008.
Many occupations are neither clearly graduate nor non-graduate, thus offering risky 
signals. The risk itself can be quantified in terms of pay. More and more school-leavers 
have to become graduates in order to earn only average pay. To define the latter the 
arithmetic mean is used, thus discounting the fact that the wage distribution is highly 
skewed (many people receive low pay, a small number are highly paid), but this average 
is treated broadly as any (hourly) wage between 30 per cent below and 30 per cent 
above the precise mean. Looking only at non-manual work, in 1993 over 24 per cent of 
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graduates were in this wage band. By 2008 the figure was over 34 per cent. To earn a 
merely average pay it is increasingly necessary to be a graduate; currently, average pay 
requires one-third of employees to be graduate. It is quite possible that in another 15 
years about half of all those on average pay will be required to be graduates. The bar is 
not rising, it is sinking.
The increase in graduations can be interpreted as a success story, but it also leads to a 
growing grey area where it is no longer clear what is and what is not a graduate job, or 
whether a graduate job produces more than average pay. The risk environment for pro-
spective students is increasing.
The Distribution of Risk
A central concept in the above discussion is the importance of distributions. There is little 
point in showing that on average graduates earn more than non-graduates if the pay of 
the two groups nevertheless overlaps considerably. The arithmetic means are £10.90 per 
hour for graduates and £7.90 for their nearest competitors, those with an A-level or 
equivalent. On average being a graduate pays. However, the distributions greatly overlap. 
This is demonstrated in Figure 1, which, averaging across all years of the LFS, shows the 
percentage distribution of pay for graduates (the solid line) against school-leavers with 
only A-levels (broken line). The (modal) average pay for the former is clearly higher, as 
seen in the positions of the peaks of the two curves, but a high proportion of graduates 
earns much the same as A-level school-leavers, so that many graduates benefit little from 
their degrees. Getting a degree is a gamble.
0
5%
10%
15%
0 10 20 30
hourly pay (£)
graduates school-leavers
Figure 1. Distribution of hourly pay for graduates and school-leavers with A-levels.
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The pay distribution can be seen in more detail in the first two columns of Table 1, which, 
building on the previous analysis, breaks this into the following categories:
1. Below average: Less than 30 per cent below mean pay of all employees (graduate 
or non-graduate)
2. Broad average: between 30 per cent below and 30 per cent above the precise 
mean
3. Above average: More than 30 per cent above the mean.
To maximise sample size, years are now grouped into two periods: the last years of the 
old century and the first of the new.
The first column unsurprisingly shows that graduates predominate in the above-
average wage group while only a small percentage are below average. So far so good. 
However, the situation is dramatically worse in the later period with the percentage of 
graduates in the higher paid group plummeting while the percentage in the low-paid 
group rises considerably.
Clearly, graduates would expect to be doing non-manual work and to compare their 
pay to that of other non-manual employees. Based on average pay for non-manual 
employees the final two columns show a more equal distribution of graduates across the 
wage groups, but in the later period there is an even bigger drop in the proportion in the 
higher pay category and a big increase in the lowest, while around half are in the average 
pay band.
To look at this the other way around, instead of showing the percentage of graduates 
who fall into each wage band, Table 2 examines the percentage of each band comprising 
graduates. Over time this is likely to increase at all three levels because the percentage of 
Table 1. The distribution of graduates across wage bands.
All employees Non-manual employees
Wages 1993 2008 1993 2008
Below average 6.6 10.3 8.2 27.1
Average 28.7 38.0 43.9 49.8
Above average 64.7 51.7 47.9 23.1
Total % 100 100 100 100
Table 2. The percentage of graduates within wage bands.
All employees Non-manual employees
Wages 1993 2008 1993 2008
Below average 2.8 7.1 6.3 15.6
Average 10.3 18.8 24.2 34.3
Above average 40.9 48.2 51.7 57.2
Average % 14.9 22.0 24.8 34.5
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graduates in employment has increased. The final row of Table 2 shows that the percentage 
in employment overall increased from 14.9 per cent to 22 per cent. The biggest increases 
were in the highly paid and average paid groups. Taking non-manual workers only we 
see a much more serious position, with a small increase in the highest paid group but an 
alarming increase in the low-paid group; the percentage of graduates in this nearly 
doubles in size. So we can see that the increase in graduations has led to a substantial 
increase in poorly paid graduate employment in non-manual work. The graduate explosion 
is associated with an increased entry into non-manual work, but more specifically into 
low-paid non-manual work.
Risk, Higher Education, and the Service Class
There has been much argument over the relationship of class of origin to both educa-
tional achievement and subsequent class outcomes. Although evolving into more com-
plex arguments over the role of cultural capital in these relationships (e.g. Harrison and 
Waller, 2010), class distributions surely remain important. Most evidence seems to 
suggest that class background is important to obtaining entry into higher education but 
subsequently confers some though often little further advantage, (Goldthorpe, 2007). 
These two stages seem important in other ways. This analysis has been undertaken here 
using the BHPS. As this is not central to the argument the results are not shown, but they 
confirm that the higher the father’s class, the more likely a child will graduate and then 
enter the service class, but father’s class has little association beyond this with either 
doing a typically graduate job or high pay. In fact, it also appears that father’s class is 
decreasingly associated even with educational success.
For economists the graduate premium is an indicator of the success of human capital 
theory. The premium has held up over time, suggesting not only that the theory is correct 
but that demand for skills is continuously rising, in support therefore also of the ‘technol-
ogy bias thesis’. Sociology has a different way of looking at this but with somewhat simi-
lar expectations. Essential at least to some views of occupational class, the rising demand 
for skills leads employers to offer contracts to employees which are intended to retain the 
loyalty of their more skilled employees. This generates a class of employees whose con-
tracts encourage continued service even while their skills give them considerable auton-
omy, as exemplified in part by increasing graduations within this group. The class result 
seems a parallel to the arguments of economists: a degree is increasingly necessary to 
entry into a ‘good job’. In 1993 graduates comprised 52 per cent of employees in the 
upper service class (USC), 24 per cent of the lower service class (LSC). By 2008 these 
figures were 56 per cent and 35 per cent, demonstrating that in the USC an upper ceiling 
is perhaps being reached while there is a vigorous growth of ‘professionalisation’ (if we 
say that graduate work is an aspect of being a professional at least) in the LSC.
Despite the rises in the size of the service class and their basis in graduations, it is by 
no means the case that entry into the service class is necessarily worthwhile economi-
cally. Pay varies enormously within classes (Savage, 1992: 77–8; Van de Werfhorst, 
2007) but even in terms of averages the advantage is less clear than it was. Table 3 shows 
the average pay in the three ‘top’ classes where graduate employment is common. 
Because distributions are so important, both the median and the mean are shown. Looking 
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at the median, which gives the average at the midpoint of the distribution, there is a clear 
wage hierarchy across the classes, both amongst non-graduates and graduates while 
graduates also earn more than non-graduates in all classes. Further, this average increases 
over time (with the exception of graduates in the intermediate class), though it is of note 
that the increase is stronger amongst non-graduates. However, while the class hierarchy 
and difference between graduates and non-graduates applies also when the mean is cal-
culated, the increase over time for graduates is at best negligible and even slightly 
negative.
This therefore does not mean that all graduates have done badly; rather, the ranks of 
the graduate sector have been so swelled that they now include many poorly paid people 
– they affect the mean far more than the median. Any class, and especially the simple 
label ‘service class’, masks very substantial heterogeneity in terms of wages. To return to 
the analysis shown in Figure 1, which compared the wage distribution of graduates in 
employment to that of school-leavers with A-levels, the same is undertaken in Figure 2 
Table 3. Average pay within the higher and lower service class and intermediate class (£ per hour).
Non-graduate employees Graduate employees
 Median Mean Median Mean
1993 2008 1993 2008 1993 2008 1993 2008
USC 9.5 11.0 10.2 11.2 11.9 12.5 12.7 12.6
LSC 7.1 8.3 7.7 8.8 10.1 10.7 10.6 10.9
Intermediate 5.3 6.2 5.8 6.8 7.3 7.2 8.1 7.8
0
2%
6%
10%
0 10 20 30
hourly pay (£)
graduates school-leavers
Figure 2. Distribution of hourly pay for graduates and school-leavers with A-levels (upper 
service class).
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Table 4. Effects of education on log hourly wages (OLS) and employment in upper service 
class (logistic regression).
Hourly wages USC employment
1993 1998 2003 2008 1993 1998 2003 2008
Degree 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.46 20.20 16.96 15.79 11.73
A-level 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.19 2.84 2.65 2.57 2.34
(Pseudo) R2 .44 .45 .44 .40 .31 .31 .30 .26
N 18325 55806 45603 38543 18135 55316 44534 37620
Notes: Controls not shown: age, age squared, gender, ethnicity, job tenure, industry, region, proportion femi-
nine in occupation. All results significant to p<.001.
for employees in the upper service class only. Here the distributions overlap very consid-
erably. It makes little difference to the majority of people in the USC whether they have 
a degree or not; a degree helps get a job in the USC but confers little further wage 
advantage.
Finally, bringing the two forms of analysis together, results from two regressions are 
shown in Table 4 for the effects of education. The first four columns give results for the 
effects of education on (log) wages (using ordinary least squares, not showing controls). 
The figures can be interpreted as roughly the percentage effect on actual wages of having 
either a degree or A-levels (or equivalent), compared to having a low (or no) education. 
Thus, in this comparison, a degree in 1993 increases hourly wages by about 52 per cent, 
much higher than the effect for A-levels, so again on average a degree pays, now control-
ling for other factors. However, by 2003 the degree effect diminishes slightly and by 
2008 substantially while that of A-levels rises, reducing the gap from nearly 40 to less 
than 30 percentage points, thus again indicating the increasing risk of educational invest-
ments. The next four columns look at entry into the USC (including job-level controls 
such as industrial sector because promotion into a managerial job might in some cases 
depend on this). Here the figures are the effect on the odds of entry. In 1993 a degree 
massively raises the odds of having a job in the USC relative to those with little educa-
tion. If a degree is not an entry requirement it helps a great deal. However, the benefit 
declines over time and by 2008 had decreased considerably.
Concluding Discussion
Sociology in its early days tended to be a pessimistic subject, seeking to explain a per-
ceived loss of community, the depredations of industrialisation, and new, profound forms 
of inequality and oppression. While the subject subsequently became more expansive 
and optimistic, for instance through the writings of Parsons, indicating that social pro-
cesses tended to maintain the social structure, or Bell, for whom there are new bases of 
social progress, a second wave of despondency has developed, especially through the 
concept of the ‘risk society’ popularised by Beck. In contrast to Bell’s knowledge soci-
ety, and also to the underlying optimism in much thinking by economists, we have an 
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explosion of risk, uncertainty, and ‘unknowing’. Perhaps most disturbing is that we can 
transfer this pessimism to an understanding of higher education, the development of 
which is perhaps one of modern society’s greatest achievements.
In the words of an unemployed graduate reported in a newspaper report on youth 
unemployment in the UK (The Independent, 11 October 2011):
… our generation was given a message that there would be a world of opportunities waiting for 
us after university – but what are these opportunities? Mostly just internships that don’t pay for 
the basics of living. It’s a tough time to be young.
Government cuts and recession have recently added to this, but also important is that 
while a degree is more and more a prerequisite for a ‘good’ job, paradoxically it is 
increasingly uneconomic for a substantial proportion of graduates. Many are graduates 
earning non-graduate pay who can perhaps be seen as paying an economic price for the 
expansion of higher education encouraged by government. They are what can be called 
a ‘frictional loss’ required by the system to operate at a high tempo. Individuals cannot 
and do not calculate the expected returns to their educational investments, not even indi-
rectly, but are led to believe by the assertions of economists and politicians that education 
pays. The cost of their educational investments can therefore be put up very considera-
bly, raising the risk of failed investments for more and more people. As Halsey (1997) 
argues, aggregate access to higher education is not so much an economic as a political 
decision.
This does not mean that young people’s educational decisions are unaffected by costs. 
This can be the increase in direct costs, the rise in opportunity costs if work alternatives 
to study become increasingly attractive, or the effects of recession, which lowers income 
prospects. The latter is possibly the cause of a slowing down in the increase in demand 
for university places in England from 2008 to 2010 (Campo et al., 2011: 60), and there 
are now signs that the British ‘natural experiment’ – the trebling of tuition fees – is low-
ering university enrolment (by about 7% over the previous year), as widely reported in 
the national media in January 2012 on the basis of figures from the Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service. However, far from indicating that individual and instru-
mental rationality works (because the decision might be based on an instinctive feeling 
that the higher costs are prohibitive, or even unfair), this suggests an increasing and 
increasingly risky burden on the decision-making of young people.
Risk is also increasingly affecting institutions. While it is possible to argue that 
through expansion higher education is changing from being a ‘premodern to a modern 
institution’ (Barnett, 1994: 3–4), according to Barnett the increasing reliance on concepts 
of rationality and performance which this entails also comes at a cost: ‘higher education 
is being locked into a Weberian iron cage of over-prescriptive rationality, of given ends 
and of operationalism’ (1994: 5). Institutions of higher education, and within these their 
professional staffs, are being made more accountable, but one purpose behind this 
improved transparency is the quest for greater competition between institutions. These 
often now operate on pseudo-market lines especially in ‘liberal’ countries such as the UK 
and the USA, visible not only in teaching but in making universities profitable research 
markets (Washburn, 2005). More ‘corporatist’ countries such as Germany (Kehm, 1999) 
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are now following suit, if more cautiously. We therefore have two apparently contrary 
processes: on the one hand, increasing rationality in the form of consistent measurement 
of inputs into and outputs from universities, on the other the growing differentiation and 
complexity of institutions, degree formats, and courses – all part of the ‘commodifica-
tion’ of higher education.
That risk now extends to institutions is not surprising. While it has been argued that 
there is no crisis in higher education, which by and large comprises relatively successful 
institutions in terms of both organisation and morale (Watson, 2009), massive cuts in 
government spending have changed this. Both young people and universities are now 
caught between two government policies, one designed to encourage expansion, itself 
largely a response to previous failures in educational policy, and the other to encourage 
contraction as a result of the perceived need to reduce government spending.
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